The Hungarian Flank Has Collapsed: What Comes Next for Georgia?
Georgian opposition is celebrating the results of the parliamentary elections in Hungary, hoping that the regime change will help impose additional EU sanctions, ultimately benefiting them as well.
Yesterday, the Hungarian opposition, represented by Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party, secured a majority of votes in Hungary’s parliamentary elections. Georgian politicians from the ruling Georgian Dream party, who were present at the elections as OSCE observers as well as by personal invitation from Viktor Orbán’s ruling Fidesz party, stated that the elections were conducted peacefully and, overall, that the entire process was democratic and competitive.
However, in reality, while Georgia was celebrating Easter and remains in the midst of the holiday period, the European Union was, in essence, playing the same card it had used in 2024 during the parliamentary elections in Georgia.
In particular, on all major European television channels, the Hungarian parliamentary elections were portrayed as a historic moment – the culmination of a struggle between the pro-Russian authoritarian leader Viktor Orbán and pro-European forces represented by the Tisza Party and its leader.
Many in Europe hoped that Orbán’s 16-year rule would come to an end, that a new government would reset relations with the European Union, and that, as in the case of Georgia in 2024, Hungary’s new leaders would be more compliant and more responsive, particularly in matters concerning the Russian Federation and, undoubtedly, the conflict in Ukraine.
It is no secret that the principal divide between the core European bureaucracy and some of its members – including Hungary and Slovakia, as well as countries seeking integration into the Union, such as Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and now Armenia – has emerged along geopolitical lines.
Georgia and its political elite, represented by Georgian Dream, proved less compliant and unwilling to engage in efforts to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia on Europe’s behalf. Consequently, they were perceived as geopolitical “traitors” in Brussels and declared persona non grata. Attempts to influence Georgia through external financial and political intervention in favor of pro-European protests and forces did not enable the local opposition to win the 2024 parliamentary elections.
Viktor Orbán, in effect, became the first and only European leader not only to support Georgian Dream – explicitly stating that the European Union had attempted to change the regime in Georgia – but also to travel to Tbilisi the very next day, visit the capital, and openly support the ruling party.
This was not forgiven, as the European bureaucracy is now effectively conducting an active “cold war” against Georgia’s ruling party. Consequently, these elections also carried significant geopolitical importance for Georgian Dream.
Many in Georgia, not only within the government but also in the opposition, anticipated this. In particular, the Georgian opposition seeks to frame the global situation as a struggle between pro-Russian regimes and civilized European democratic forces. In this narrative, the “enemies of civilization” included Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, the Ayatollah in Iran, Russia, North Korea, and Viktor Orbán; less frequently mentioned is Fico in Slovakia, but Georgian Dream and Bidzina Ivanishvili are also included.
Thus, the removal of Nicolás Maduro was interpreted as the first signal of the collapse of this “axis.” The death of the Ayatollah was similarly perceived within this framework, although Iran did not suffer defeat and no regime change occurred. Orbán’s defeat in the elections is likewise seen as part of a chain reaction that could ultimately lead to the removal of Georgian Dream.
Among the first to respond was Salome Zurabishvili. The fifth President of Georgia, a staunch opponent of the ruling party and an advocate of strongly pro-European views, addressed her fellow citizens:
“Congratulations from all the Georgians who prayed for the victory of democracy in Hungary! We believe in a stronger Europe that does not yield to either hybrid or direct aggression from Russia!”
In turn, former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, formerly of Georgian Dream and currently residing in Germany, articulated the expectations and objectives of the so-called pro-European Georgian opposition even before the official announcement of the election results:
“It is an important day not only for the future of Hungarian democracy, but for the future of democratic Europe. Orbán’s defeat would mark a critical milestone in weakening the populist-autocratic networks he has built across Europe. It would also constitute a significant blow to Russia and to autocratic regimes similar to the Georgian government, which has mirrored Orbán’s model of dismantling democracy, including through widespread disinformation and false propaganda.”
He later also congratulated the Hungarian and Georgian peoples, as well as Europe as a whole:
“I congratulate Péter Magyar, the Tisza Party, and the Hungarian people on this historic victory. This is a victory for European democracy and for the democratic world as a whole. Let the defeat of Russia and its proxies continue wherever they operate across the globe. This is a significant victory against widespread disinformation and propaganda projected by the Orbán government, which significantly undermines electoral integrity. Democratic actors around the world should study the Hungarian example and learn from its success in challenging and weakening populist-autocratic networks built by Orbán, so they can be confronted and dismantled once and for all.”
Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze was more restrained in his assessment, congratulating the opposition and expressing the Georgian Dream government’s readiness to continue close cooperation with the new authorities. The importance of stable democratic development in both countries was also emphasized.
Notably, a few days before the elections, Hungary was visited by J.D. Vance, who openly supported Viktor Orbán and, moreover, during a rally with Orbán’s supporters, held a phone call with Donald Trump, who also expressed support for the incumbent government during the conversation.
Some analysts argued that this situation and the resulting outcome highlight the importance of external intervention, particularly in terms of propaganda and financial support. However, in the presence of high voter mobilization, neither authoritarian regimes nor external interference can truly determine the distribution of power and votes.
If the above assertions made by pro-European analysts supporting the Hungarian opposition are accurate, then this outcome is equally unfavorable for the Georgian opposition, as it suggests that their defeat in the 2024 parliamentary elections was not due to alleged Russian interference or electoral fraud, but rather to the lack of support from the Georgian majority.
In order, by their own logic, to defeat the “authoritarian regime” of Georgian Dream, they require not merely a minimal percentage advantage over the ruling party, but rather the support of an absolute majority of the Georgian population.
Since such support is not visible even on the horizon, and the opposition’s rating has declined further following unsuccessful protests in 2024–2026, the upcoming parliamentary elections in October 2028 are unlikely to produce any fundamentally positive change for the opposition.
Moreover, if the Hungarian case holds as a lesson, then ongoing external pressure from the European Union on Georgian society will likewise fail to yield positive outcomes. External intervention may allow political actors to exist, organize demonstrations, and even finance actions such as the October 2025 attack on the presidential administration building, but it cannot ensure electoral victory.
Finally, there is a third lesson. According to some European analysts, the overwhelming victory of Orbán’s opponents was also due to support from rural constituencies – residents of the regions – rather than solely politically sophisticated urban populations. A similar situation occurred in Georgia, where the opposition, despite consolidating all its efforts, managed only to narrowly secure major cities such as Tbilisi, while suffering a complete and total defeat in the regions.
Thus, the Hungarian case already points to three fundamental problems for the self-proclaimed pro-Western Georgian opposition. On the one hand, external intervention is important but not a decisive factor, while the opposition primarily relies on this element in its electoral campaign; on the other hand, even with such support, defeating the ruling authorities in Georgia requires constitutional backing – a constitutional majority – rather than a minimal percentage advantage. Ultimately, to win parliamentary elections, it is necessary to actively campaign beyond major urban centers and secure support in the regions. The Georgian opposition possesses the first element, but the latter two key components are entirely absent.
If the Georgian opposition lacks the most crucial element – comprehensive support, particularly in the regions – then the question arises: what exactly are they celebrating?
At the same time, what the ruling Georgian Dream party and its electorate should be concerned about is the possibility of a shift in Hungary’s approach, as a member of the European Union, toward its policy on Georgia.
Viktor Orbán was important for Georgian Dream not because they were ideologically aligned or jointly promoted conservative values, but because he was among those who understood that engagement with the Russian Federation is necessary, and that the European Union cannot exist or ensure its security without taking Russia’s interests into account – to assume otherwise would be, quite simply, irrational.
These ideas were repeatedly expressed in Georgia across various platforms, where it was openly and explicitly argued that the Russian Federation was allegedly unnecessary for constructing the European Union’s security architecture. According to this perspective, it would be sufficient to rely on Ukraine and Georgia.
Georgian Dream did not share this position and instead found support in figures such as Viktor Orbán and, to be explicit, Robert Fico in Slovakia. Orbán was not merely a supporter but an active advocate of this view – whether or not these positions were accepted in Europe is a separate matter.
Another important aspect is that Viktor Orbán blocked EU-wide sanctions against Georgia. The European Union, within the framework of its policy, continues to exert pressure on Georgian Dream in a way that seeks, on the one hand, to avoid excessive harm to the Georgian population, while on the other hand maximizing constraints on it.
At some point, the EU recognized that the greater the pressure from Europe, the stronger the resistance would become. Nevertheless, it cannot leave Georgian Dream’s policies unanswered. As a result, attempts were made to introduce sanctions at the level of the entire European Union, but these were blocked and actively opposed by Viktor Orbán.
If the new government in Hungary revises this approach and ceases to block such initiatives, we may witness, for the first time in EU-Georgia relations, the imposition of sanctions – not at the level of individual states and not limited to restrictions on holders of official passports, but against Georgia as a whole and on behalf of the European Union.
How realistic such a shift is remains an open question, as the situation with the now-governing Tisza Party is not entirely straightforward, and it may refrain from taking such radical steps. However, the threat exists, and Georgian Dream must already consider how to respond to such a development.
From the perspective of trade, imports, exports, and the overall well-being of the Georgian economy, the European Union is not as critical as it is often portrayed. Many, for instance, are still unaware that strategic relations between the United States and Georgia did not entail any substantial economic, military, or political privileges – they were, in essence, a declaration of intent.
However, the European Union’s weight, particularly in terms of financial flows and private capital transfers into the country, is significant. Moreover, the EU also functions as an ideological construct – a system of values that promotes a particular understanding of prosperity.
Therefore, the formal imposition of sanctions by the European Union against Georgia would constitute a serious ideological blow, as well as a blow to the country’s position in the international economy and its overall image.
Thus, the central question now facing Georgian Dream is whether the new Hungarian authorities will not only align themselves with radically anti-Russian forces but also adopt similarly harsh rhetoric toward Georgia.
Notably, calls have already emerged from opposition representatives and their supporters to intensify efforts to impose individual EU sanctions against members of the Georgian Dream government, their media, and their supporters. In their view, Hungary will no longer block such initiatives. In Brussels, there are already many willing to pursue this course. Whether Europe will move toward further deterioration of relations with Tbilisi, escalating tensions in the hope of advancing its geopolitical interests in Georgia, remains to be seen.
In conclusion, a significant portion of the so-called pro-European opposition operates within a zero-sum game – what may colloquially be described as “all or nothing.” Consequently, any blow to the ruling party is already perceived as a victory. They hope that Budapest will no longer block European “hawks” and will allow this radical wing of the Brussels bureaucracy to act against Georgian Dream, even at the cost of damage to the state as a whole.
In their view, following a change of power, the opposition will implement whatever is required by Brussels and reconstruct Georgia in its own image – an image that, allegedly, will automatically be better, wealthier, more successful, and, most importantly, will justify all sacrifices.
This is how the Georgian opposition perceives the situation.
The article was initially published by Cautious Caucasus in Russian and is available here.